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A B S T R A C T
Memories of Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) seem to be very detailed and stable over time. At
present, there is still no satisfactory explanation for the NDEs’ rich phenomenology. Here we
compared phenomenological characteristics of NDE memories with the reported experience’s
intensity. We included 152 individuals with a self-reported “classical” NDE (i.e. occurring in life-
threatening conditions). All participants completed a mailed questionnaire that included a
measure of phenomenological characteristics of memories (the Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire; MCQ) and a measure of NDE’s intensity (the Greyson NDE scale). Greyson NDE
scale total score was positively correlated with MCQ total score, suggesting that participants who
described more intense NDEs also reported more phenomenological memory characteristics of
NDE. Using MCQ items, our study also showed that NDE’s intensity is associated in particular
with sensory details, personal importance and reactivation frequency variables.
1. Introduction
Since the expression “Near-Death Experience” (NDE) was ﬁrst used in literature to describe memory of impending death situations
(Heim, 1891), further work has been devoted to this type of experience in an attempt to understand its singularity. Nonetheless, very
few scientiﬁc articles have examined the particularity of NDE memories (see Greyson, 2007; Palmieri et al., 2014; Thonnard et al.,
2013; van Lommel, 2011). Although there is not yet a consensus on the deﬁnition of NDEs, those experiences have been described as
“profound psychological events with transcendental and mystical elements typically occurring to individuals close to death or in
situations of intense physical or emotional danger” (Greyson, 2000a). As a result of this intense experience, near-death experiencers
(NDErs) usually report very detailed memories (Thonnard et al., 2013) that seem to be unchanged over time (Greyson, 2007). From a
cognitive perspective, to date no theory can explain the rich phenomenology associated with NDE memories (Palmieri et al., 2014;
Thonnard et al., 2013; van Lommel, 2011). Thus, one interesting issue is why such a clear memory trace is created for this experience
and little is known about what exactly accounts for the enhanced memory.
For some years now, more and more NDErs’ testimonies have been compiled which demonstrate the compelling intensity of this
experience (Moody, 1975; Ring, 1980). While reported narratives appear to contain similarities and recurrent components (i.e.
elements frequently reported by NDErs; e.g. feeling of peacefulness, out-of-body experiences (OBEs); Blanke & Dieguez, 2009;
Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Facco & Agrillo, 2012), diﬀerences in terms of experience intensity (i.e. the depth of the experience)
are reported (Charland-Verville et al., 2014). Notably, it seems that the intensity of NDE components diﬀers when comparing NDErs
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recruited in retrospective versus prospective studies –all features seem more frequently reported in retrospective as compared to
prospective studies (Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Mobbs &Watt, 2011). Finally, in some cases, NDEs are so intense that the NDErs
will considerably change their personal attitudes, beliefs, and set of values (e.g. a decreased fear of death, an increase in spirituality, a
greater appreciation of life) in a sustainable manner (Bauer, 1985; van Lommel, van Wees, Meyers, & Elﬀerich, 2001).
Because the scientiﬁc literature devoted to the investigation of NDE memories is limited, one may attempt to better understand
their particularities using the broader literature on autobiographical memory. If we consider autobiographic memory as “memory for
the events of one’s life” (Conway & Rubin, 1993; see the Self-Memory System (SMS); Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway,
Singer, & Tagini, 2004), we could consider NDE memories as part of this memory system. The literature has shown that intensity of an
experience aﬀects the properties of the subsequent autobiographical memories more so than do valence or the age of the memory
(e.g. Holmes, 1970; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). Highly intense events are ﬁrmly anchored and remembered in memory (Bradley,
1994) and this is partly due to associated emotions. In the literature certain models suggest that the eﬀects of emotion on memory
could be explained without suggesting speciﬁc mechanisms associated with the emotional arousal (e.g. Bradley, 1994). From that
perspective, the enhanced memory observed for emotional events might be due to “ordinary” factors (e.g. enhanced attention and/or
increased elaboration) –as is the case with non-emotional events. In contrast, other models do suggest the existence of some addi-
tional special mechanisms associated with emotional arousal (e.g. McGaugh, 2000). Neural and hormonal mechanisms speciﬁc to
emotional stimuli might inﬂuence their memory encoding (e.g. notably because of release of hormones; Cahill &McGaugh, 1998;
McGaugh, 2000), leading to more elaborated memory representations (Bradley, 1994). Since NDEs are known to imply a great
emotional involvement (generally positive in valence) and to be high intensity (Moody, 1975), we can easily suggest that NDE
memories can then beneﬁt from a special encoding and storage (e.g. strong consolidation) that make them more phenomenologically
detailed and more persistent than other kinds of memories. From the experiencers’ perspective, NDE memories are characterized by a
sense of “phenomenological certainty” (Dell’Olio, 2010). Recently, Thonnard et al. (2013) investigated NDE memories using the
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) built to analyze phenomenological char-
acteristics of real and imagined memories, and showed that NDE memories –as deﬁned by the Greyson NDE scale (i.e. total
score≥ 7/32; Greyson, 1983)– contain more phenomenological characteristics (e.g. emotions, contextual and sensory information)
than imagined, real event and coma memories. This study suggests that NDEs cannot be considered as imagined event memories but
rather a sort of “hyper reality” and seem unrivalled memories. Moreover, Greyson (2007) has shown that reports of NDEs have not
changed over time, in assessing reported second accounts 20 years after the original one. Therefore, NDE memories seem to have very
rich phenomenological characteristics and are stable over time. From a neurological perspective, NDE memories have been in-
vestigated in only very few studies. Nonetheless, Palmieri et al. (2014) have replicated Thonnard et al.’ (2013)’ ﬁndings and have
further shown using electroencephalography (EEG) recordings that, at a neural level, NDE memories are stored as “episodic memories
of events experienced in a peculiar state of consciousness” –and not as imagined event memories. More generally, the crucial question
remains as to where and how the brain can store this experience (Agrillo, 2011).
Surely, other inﬂuencing factors can intervene in the creation of an exceptionally clear memory trace. As the term itself suggests,
NDEs typically occur in situations in which people are close to death or are perceived as such. This context might strengthen the
intensity of what they perceived and also makes the event “threatening” for individuals, independently of the associated positive
feelings. Through evolution, human memory has developed the ability to preferentially retain events that are relevant for survival.
Indeed, it would be adaptive to integrate relevant information on adverse events to be prepared for them in the future (see
Porter & Peace, 2007). However, regarding the memory characterization, it seems that it is the perception of the experience that is
relevant, and not being “near-death” as coma memories include less phenomenological characteristics than NDE memories (Thonnard
et al., 2013). Furthermore, NDEs seem to be (at least in part) due to physiological mechanisms, because NDErs really perceived the
experience while we do not have any certainty that there are associated and appropriate stimulus existing in reality (Braithwaite,
2008). Indeed, it seems that NDEs have physiological origins –for example, OBEs caused by an impairment of temporo-parietal area
structure (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004). Finally, to face with those potentially dangerous situations,
humans can develop various adaptive mental and physical responses, including dissociation. Psychological theories have proposed
that NDEs are dissociative states in which individuals experience a dissociation of the self-identity from bodily sensations (Irwin,
1993), leading them to experience pleasurable dimensions and sensations instead of the unpleasant event itself (Pﬁster, 1930). As a
support to this view, Greyson (2000b) suggested that NDEs are probably more compatible with a normal response to stress than a
pathological disorder. We can then consider NDEs as an integral part of an adaptive response to physical or emotional danger.
In psychological science, subjective self-report scales and questionnaires have been developed to collect data on many subjective
states and contents of consciousness. However, while a growing number of such scales have been published on several diﬀerent
topics, there are only a very limited number of scales developed to collect data about NDEs speciﬁcally. To date, the most widely used
standardized tool to identify NDEs in research is the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983). This scale provides a cut-oﬀ score (i.e. total
score≥ 7/32; Greyson, 1983) permitting a standardized identiﬁcation of NDErs. The Greyson NDE scale reﬂects the intensity of the
NDE since it considers the amount of ticked experienced dimensions (i.e. 0 = “not present” or presence of the item) and the gradation
of intensity in provided scoring (i.e. 1 = “mildly or ambiguously present,” and 2 = “deﬁnitively present”). Therefore, according to
the scale, the Greyson NDE scale total score (out of total possible 32 points) reﬂects the NDE overall intensity (Greyson, 1983; Lange,
Greyson, & Houran, 2004). Few other authors have undertaken the considerable challenge of designing scales to assess NDEs and only
two other scales have been proposed: The Weighted Core Experience Index (WCEI; Ring, 1980) and a short version of the 16-item
Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) called The Near-Death Experience Scale-6 scale (NDE-6; Prosnick & Evans, 2003). However,
Ring’s WCEI was neither based on statistical analyses nor tested for coherence or reliability. Although Greyson's construction of the
Greyson NDE scale has subsequently addressed these limitations, it seems that, in general, we remain rather limited to investigate this
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experience and its associated rich phenomenology. Nonetheless, other scales, but non-speciﬁc to NDEs, may be used to assess this
experience and, in particular, its subsequent memory. Notably, some authors have used the MCQ (e.g. Palmieri et al., 2014; Thonnard
et al., 2013) with the aim of assessing subjective qualities of NDEs’ memory characteristics. In fact, the MCQ has been constructed, by
design, in a more extensive area aiming at assessing all types of memory –whatever the event or content of the evaluated memory.
More speciﬁcally, the MCQ permits to examine qualitative characteristics of memories, in terms of sensory and contextual details and
cognitive processes involved in the recall of a memory. Nowadays, the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) and the MCQ (Johnson
et al., 1988) are the two most commonly used standardized questionnaires in research to evaluate the NDE and its memory.
Although described as occurring in near-death states where the brain is thought to be working with altered capacities, NDErs can
generally give a very detailed narrative account of their experience (Moody, 1975; Thonnard et al., 2013) and it seems that the NDEs
can diﬀer in term of experience intensity (Charland-Verville et al., 2014). We then wondered about the variation of NDE memory
details according to the intensity of the experience. To the best of our knowledge, no study has formally compared the association of
the NDE intensity according to the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) with the phenomenological characterization of this type of
memory according to the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988) in the same sample of individuals who have lived a NDE. From a theoretical
perspective, although the subjective experience reported by NDErs does not itself provide an explanation, it nevertheless can give
some indications as to which aspects of the NDE an explanation should account for. Using the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) and
the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988), the present study aimed at exploring (1) the association of both the NDE’s intensity (Greyson NDE
scale total score) and the amount of NDE memory characteristics (MCQ total score) with demographic data (age at interview, age at
NDE and time since NDE); (2) the association of NDE’s intensity (Greyson NDE scale total score) with the amount of NDE memory
characteristics (MCQ total score) and, more in particular, (3) with the diﬀerent phenomenological characteristics of NDE memory
(MCQ items).
2. Material and methods
Participants were recruited via the International Associations for Near-Death Studies (IANDS France and IANDS Flanders) and the
Coma Science Group (University and University Hospital of Liège, Belgium). Participants were mailed a questionnaire including the
Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983), the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988), and items about socio-
demographic (gender, age at NDE, age at interview) and clinical (time since NDE, presence of life-threatening event, etiology of
coma, presence of coma – i.e. a period of unconsciousness > 1 h; Posner, Saper, & Plum, 2007). We ﬁrst assessed the NDE memory
using the Greyson NDE scale. This scale is a validated (Greyson, 1983; Lange et al., 2004) 16-item multiple-choice tool used to permit
a standardized identiﬁcation of NDEs with a total score cut-oﬀ of 7 and to quantify the intensity of the NDE (i.e. total score ranging
Table 1
The Greyson NDE Scale (Greyson, 1983).
Feature Question Response
Altered time perception “Did time seem to speed up or slow down?” 0 = No; 1 = Time seemed to go faster or slower than usual; 2 = Everything
seemed to be happening at once, or time stopped or last all meaning
Speeded thoughts “Were your thoughts speeded up?” 0 = No; 1 = Faster than usual; 2 = Incredibly fast
Life review “Did scenes from your past come back to you?” 0 = No; 1 = Remembered many past events; 2 = Past ﬂashed before me, out
my control
Understanding “Did you suddenly seem to understand
everything?”
0 = No; 1 = About myself or others; 2 = About the universe
Peacefulness “Did you have a feeling of peace or pleasantness?” 0 = No; 1 = Relief or calmness; 2 = Incredible peace or pleasantness
Happiness/joy “Did you have a feeling of joy?” 0 = No; 1 = Happiness; 2 = Incredible joy
Harmony/unity “Did you feel a sense of harmony or unity with the
universe?”
0 = No; 1 = No longer in conﬂict with nature; 2 = United, one with the world
Bright light “Did you see, or feel surrounded by, a brilliant
light?”
0 = No; 1 = Unusually bright light; 2 = Light clearly of mystical or other-
worldly origin
Heightened senses “Were your senses more vivid than usual?” 0 = No; 1 = More vivid than usual; 2 = Incredibly more vivid
Extrasensory perception “Did you seem to be aware of things going on
elsewhere, as if by extrasensory perception (ESP)?”
0 = No; 1 = Yes, but the facts not yet corroborated; 2 = Yes, and the facts
later corroborated
Precognitive visions “Did scenes from the future come to you?” 0 = No; 1 = Scenes from my personal future; 2 = Scenes from the world’s
future
Out-of-Body Experience “Did you feel separated from your body?” 0 = No; 1 = Lost awareness of my body; 2 = Clearly left my body and existed
outside it
Unearthly environment “Did you seem to enter some other, unearthly
world?”
0 = No; 1 = Unfamiliar and strange place; 2 = Clearly mystical or unearthly
realm
Mystical being/presence “Did you seem to encounter a mystical being or
presence, or hear an unidentiﬁable voice?”
0 = No; 1 = Unidentiﬁable voice; 2 = Deﬁnite being, or voice clearly of
mystical or unearthly origin
Encounter with deceased/
religious spirits
“Did you see deceased or religious spirits?” 0 = No; 1 = Sensed their presence; 2 = Saw them
Border/point of no return “Did you come to a border or point of no return?” 0 = No; 1 = A conscious decision to “return” to life; 2 = A barrier I was not
permitted to cross; or “sent back” to life involuntarily
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from 0 to 32). The Greyson NDE scale assesses core content components of 16 NDE features (Table 1). For each item, the scores are
arranged on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e. 0 = “not present,” 1 = “mildly or ambiguously present,” and 2 = “deﬁnitively
present”). Participants whose experience did not meet the standardized criteria (i.e. Greyson NDE scale total score < 7/32; Greyson,
1983) were not included in the present study. We also assessed the participants’ memories characteristics using a modiﬁed version
(see Table 2; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) of the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988). This version encompasses 16 rating scales
assessing feeling of re-experiencing, visual details, other sensory details, location, time, coherence, verbal component, emotion while
remembering, belief that the event is real, one’s own actions, words and thoughts, visual perspective, emotional valence, personal
importance, and reactivation frequency. A MCQ total score was derived summing all the 16 items (each on a 1–7 points Likert scale)
and referred to as the amount of memory characteristics (i.e. higher total scores reﬂect greater amount of memory characteristics). No
incentive was oﬀered for participation. Completion of the anonymous questionnaire was voluntary and taken as consent for parti-
cipation in the survey. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Liège.
Pearson's correlation tests were used to measure the linear association between variables. More speciﬁcally, correlations were
obtained using both the Greyson NDE scale total score and the MCQ total score with each demographic variable (age at interview, age
at NDE and time since NDE). Then, correlation was done between the Greyson NDE scale total score and the MCQ total score. Finally,
correlations were obtained using the Greyson NDE scale total score and each of the 16 MCQ items. We used the Shapiro-Wilk test to
evaluate the hypothesis that a given sample was from a normal population. To avoid type I errors, the level of signiﬁcance undergoes
a Bonferroni adjustment (p < 0.0021) in all statistical analyses.
3. Results
3.1. Demographic data
The distributions of demographic data and scores follow a normal distribution. The study sample included 152 individuals who
have had a NDE described experience (i.e. meeting the criteria for NDE: Greyson NDE scale total score≥ 7/32; Greyson, 1983) after a
life-threatening event (i.e. a severe brain insult; e.g. cardiac arrest, traumatism). Table 3 shows the demographic characteristics of the
entire study cohort.
Table 2
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988; adapted from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2008).
Characteristic Question Response
Feeling of re-experiencing “While remembering the event, I feel as though I am mentally reliving it” 1 = not at all, 7 completely
Visual details “My memory for this event involves visual details” 1 = none, 7 = a lot
Other sensory details “My memory for this event involves other sensory details (sounds, smells,
and/or tastes)”
1 = none, 7 = a lot
Location “I remember the location where the event took place” 1 = not at all clear, 7 = very clearly
Time “I remember the time of the day where the event took place” 1 = not at all clear, 7 = very clearly
Coherence “While remembering the event, it comes to me as a coherent story and not
as an isolated scene”
1 = not at all, 7 = completely
Verbal component “While remembering the event, it comes to me in words” 1 = not at all, 7 = a lot
Feeling emotions “While remembering the event, I feel the emotions I felt when the event
occurred”
1 = not at all, 7 = completely
Real/imagine “I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way I remember
it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur”
1 = 100% imaginary, 7 = 100% real
One’s own actions “I remember what I did during this event” 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly
One’s own words “I remember what I said during this event” 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly
One’s own thoughts “I remember what I thought during this event” 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly
Visual perspective “Previous studies have shown that people can report that they can
visualize diﬀerent memories from diﬀerent points of view. Using the
bellow mentioned categories, from which point of view do you see
yourself? (A) In your memory, you imagine the scene as an observer could
see it. As an observer, you can see yourself and other aspects of the
situation. (B) In your memory, you imagined the scene from your own
point of view (through you own eyes). You are an actor. (C) Any of the
above-mentioned perspectives described the way you remember the
situation. At which point are you observer or actor in the situation”
1 = totally observer; 7 = totally actor
Valence “When the event happened, my emotions were” −3 = very negative, 0 = neutral,
+3 = very positive
Personal importance “This event is important to me (it involves an important theme or episode
in my life)”
1 = not at all important, 7 = very
important
Reactivation frequency “Since it occurred, I have thought or talked about this event” 1 = not at all, 7 = very often
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3.2. Correlations between both scale total scores and demographic data
There were no signiﬁcant associations with the time since NDE and total scores on the Greyson NDE scale and the MCQ, meaning
that the intensity of NDE and the amount of NDE memory characteristics do not appear to vary with the amount of time that had
elapsed since NDE. There were also no signiﬁcant correlations between variables age at interview and at NDE and the Greyson NDE
and MCQ total scores (see Table 4).
3.3. Correlations between Greyson NDE scale total score, MCQ total score and items
Greyson NDE scale total score was positively correlated with MCQ total score (r = 0.29, p < 0.0005), suggesting that individuals
who described more intense NDEs also reported more phenomenological characteristics of NDEs (see Table 4). Analyses with MCQ
items showed positive correlations between the Greyson NDE scale total score and 3 of those items: other sensory details (r = 0.29,
p < 0.0005; MCQ item 3), personal importance (r = 0.22, p < 0.002; MCQ item 15), and reactivation frequency (r = 0.28,
p < 0.0005; MCQ item 16). This suggests that individuals who described more elaborate NDEs also reported more sensory char-
acteristics (i.e. sounds, smells and tastes), personal importance and reactivation frequency. No further signiﬁcant correlations were
found between the Greyson NDE scale total score and the other MCQ items (see Table 4).
Table 3
Participants’ descriptive and demographic data (N = 152). The NDE intensity (Greyson NDE scale





Age at interview (Mean in years ± SEM) 56 ± 10
Age at NDE (Mean in years ± SEM) 33 ± 14
Time since NDE (Mean in years ± SEM) 23 ± 14
Scales
Greyson NDE scale total score (Mean ± SEM, range) 16 ± 5
7–30
MCQ total score (Mean ± SEM, range) 86 ± 11
41–110
SEM= Standard Error of the Mean.
Table 4
Correlations between demographic data, Greyson NDE scale total score, MCQ total score and MCQ items.
Greyson NDE scale total score MCQ total score
Demography
Age at interview −0.11 (0.188) 0.02 (0.821)
Age at NDE −0.14 (0.079) 0.01 (0.894)
Time since NDE 0.06 (0.435) 0.005 (0.951)
MCQ total score & items




Visual details 0.07 (0.396) –
Other sensory details 0.29 (0.0002) –
Location −0.09 (0.249) –
Time 0.05 (0.538) –
Coherence 0.17 (0.04) –
Verbal component 0.13 (0.122) –
Feeling emotions 0.18 (0.026) –
Real/imagine 0.20 (0.014) –
One’s own actions −0.04 (0.581) –
One’s own words 0.14 (0.086) –
One’s own thoughts 0.04 (0.644) –
Visual perspective 0.10 (0.236) –
Valence 0.16 (0.05) –
Personal importance 0.22 (0.002) –
Reactivation frequency 0.28 (0.0004) –
Data are Pearson's correlations (p). Results in bold are statistically signiﬁcant (at p < 0.0021 after Bonferroni correction).
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4. Discussion
This retrospective study shows that the intensity of the NDE (i.e. the Greyson NDE scale total score) appears to be positively
correlated with the overall amount of retrospective phenomenological characteristics identiﬁed with the MCQ (i.e. the MCQ total
score). In other words, participants who scored higher on the Greyson NDE scale also scored higher on the MCQ. This suggests that
the more intense the NDE is, the more the memory seems to be phenomenologically detailed when NDErs later recall it. It can then be
hypothesized that the deeper the NDE is, the more the memory seems to be anchored and to beneﬁt from a special encoding, leading
the memory to contain a greater amount of phenomenological characteristics. Moreover, one can argue that NDE memory char-
acteristics would vary with the amount of time that had elapsed since the experience. However, it does not seem to be the case since
we do not ﬁnd a link between the amount of time that had elapsed since NDE and the amount of memory characteristics.
Furthermore, we also ﬁnd no association between the NDE’s intensity and the amount of time that had elapsed since the NDE. Despite
our study is not a test–retest design, our data support the view that the intensity of NDE does not seem to increase or decrease with
the time that had elapsed since the experience. In fact, except Greyson's (2007) study, it seems that very little is known about the
long-term retention of NDE memories.
Since NDEs are complex subjective experiences typically including various features, our study also clariﬁes that the NDE’s in-
tensity is associated in particular with MCQ items of sensory details (concerning sounds and smells), personal importance and
reactivation frequency. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the presence of sensory details in NDErs’ memory varies with experience’s in-
tensity. Since some studies have suggested that emotional valence increases the amount of sensory details in memory (e.g.
Schaefer & Philippot, 2005), it seems reasonable to suggest that the NDE –as highly emotional event (Thonnard et al., 2013)– may be
encoded and stored by a special memory mechanism that typically operates during the encoding of emotionally arousing events. For
example, we can speculate that intensity could increase attentional mechanisms and then be beneﬁcial for all reported sensory
details.
We also observe a relationship between the NDE’s intensity and the reactivation frequency item on the MCQ. That is, the more
intense the NDE is, the more frequently the NDE seems to be reactivated in memory. Intense events are more likely to be rehearsed
which in turn can enhance the amount of phenomenological characteristics in memory (Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen, 1998). Recently,
Thonnard et al. (2013) showed that NDE memories were as likely to be reactivated in memory as other real and imagined events
memories or coma memories that did not classify as a NDE based on the Greyson NDE scale (i.e. total score of Greyson < 7/32;
Greyson, 1983). In the present study, we nevertheless note the association between intensity and reactivation frequency variables. On
the one hand, experience memories may be intentionally and/or voluntarily brought into awareness and, on the other hand, ex-
perience memories may be reactivated internally and/or externally –sharing it with other people for example. Our results are
consistent with previous ones showing that high-intensity events memories tend to be more frequently thought or talked about than
low-intensity events memories (Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen, 1998; Waters & Leeper, 1936).
Finally, we ﬁnd that NDE’s intensity varies with the personal importance NDErs attached to the experience, suggesting that the
more intense the NDE is, the more the NDE could be considered as an important episode in NDEr’s life. Personal importance given to
the NDE could possibly enhance the overall perceived phenomenological characteristics of NDE memories. According to Conway's
Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004) model, autobiographical memories are “the
transitory mental constructions of a complex goal-driven set of control processes collectively referred to as the working self” (Conway
et al., 2004). Only a relatively small part of autobiographical memories may remain accessible in long-term memory and this se-
lection should depend on their given relevance to longer-term goals and consequently to the future. This system consists of two main
strongly interconnected components: the working self and the autobiographical memory knowledge base. In this theoretical fra-
mework, one could consider that the NDE was particularly well integrated by those both memory components –notably because the
NDE has become a highly important self-deﬁning experience– and this could explain the long-lasting accessibility of its memory
(including their phenomenological characteristics). While NDEs are closely related to experiencers’ own identity (Greyson, 2007;
Moody, 1975) and because of its self-deﬁning personal importance, NDE memories could be consider as a type of “self-deﬁning
memories” (personally meaningful and emotionally evocative memories; Singer, 2005).
We further hypothesize that NDE memories share similar certain encoding conditions as “ﬂashbulb memories”, although both
types of memories may diﬀer in term of the reminded experience and context. A “ﬂashbulb memory” can be deﬁned as “a vivid, long-
lasting memory for the circumstances surrounding the reception of news about a surprising or shocking event” (Davidson & Glisky,
2002). “Flashbulb memory” and NDE memory both are surprising events with an intense emotional content and they are perceived as
very important life event for the experiencer, although sometimes perceived subsequently (Davidson & Glisky, 2002). However, one
may also note that NDEs may be even more intense when experienced because “ﬂashbulb memories” refer to memories for the
circumstances in which a piece of news was learned (i.e. where they were when the event occurred, what they were doing) while NDE
memories refer to memories of a personally lived experience classically occurring during a life-threatening situation. Nevertheless, it
appears that, in both cases, the event seems to beneﬁt from a preferential encoding that makes then them more details than other real
or imagined events memories (for NDE memories: see Thonnard et al., 2013; for “ﬂashbulb memories”: see Finkenauer et al., 1998;
Rubin & Kozin, 1984). Moreover, previous studies have shown that both personal importance and rehearsal frequency –variables
identiﬁed in the present study as being associated with NDE’s intensity– are two variables playing a crucial role in the maintenance of
vivid memories, such as “ﬂashbulb memories” (e.g. Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Wright & Nunn, 2000). It
even appears that these variables are the two most signiﬁcant factors that allow the diﬀerentiation of ﬂashbulb and non-ﬂashbulb
memories (Tekcan & Peynircioğlu, 2002) –even more signiﬁcant than other variables such as emotional valence or the surprise eﬀect.
In short, these three variables assessed in the present study –i.e. sensory details, personal importance and reactivation frequency–
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appear to vary with intensity of the NDE and might overlap in explaining these intense NDE memories and its associated rich
phenomenology.
Still using MCQ items, intensity variations in reported NDEs do not seem to be associated with the other memory characteristics
(emotional information, visual details, conﬁdence, visual perspective, feeling of re-experiencing) assessed by the MCQ. Intriguingly,
emotional information (i.e. emotional valence, emotion while remembering) does not also appear to vary the NDE’s intensity. While
NDEs appear to include extremely high emotional content –containing even more emotional characteristics than real events mem-
ories (Thonnard et al., 2013), we ﬁnd that the presence of emotional details in NDErs’ memory may ﬂuctuate independently of
intensity variation experienced by NDErs.
From a broader cognitive perspective, the enhanced memory observed for NDEs is interesting as it suggests that humans might be
able to recall (or elaborate later) memories of a moment characterized by an atypical state of consciousness (i.e. altered state of
consciousness; Moody, 1975). Nevertheless, it is still unclear when exactly these events are experienced as well as when their memory
encoding precisely occurs. Although many authors have now improved consistency in the ﬁeld of NDEs, none of the neuropsycho-
logical and cognitive models of memory appears to fully explain the encoding and storage of NDEs. These experiences are described
as occurring in near-death states where the brain and its associated processes are thought to be working with altered capacities,
however, those ones seem to be ﬁrmly anchored and remembered in NDErs’ memories.
While resuscitation techniques are improving and providing more reported NDE testimonies (van Lommel et al., 2001), only very
few scales are present to investigate the phenomenon. In this study, the correlation between both total scores also indicates a
relationship between variables represented by the two main questionnaires used to assess a NDE and its memory in the same sample
of individuals who have lived a NDE. We observe that individuals who scored higher on one of the questionnaires also scored higher
on the other one. Then, one can ask to what extent there is an overlap between the items of the two questionnaires and to what extent
they evaluate the same aspects of the experience. However, although the correlation is highly signiﬁcant, we ﬁnd a relatively weak
linear relation. Instead, this suggests that both questionnaires may be testing diﬀerent and complementary aspects of the experience.
The Greyson NDE scale focuses on the content of the NDE and its intensity (only) at a phenomenological level while the MCQ assesses
qualitative characteristics of NDE memories and cognitive processes involved in its recall. Although the Greyson NDE scale inevitably
assesses the NDE memory by retrospectively questioning the individual about what he is remembering, the MCQ diﬀers from the
Greyson NDE scale by exploring the multimodal aspect (i.e. separately measuring sensory, perceptual, semantic and spatio-temporal
components) of the memory. This may permit to observe distinct implications of those aspects speciﬁc to NDEs in the investigation of
its rich phenomenology. Finally, the MCQ also allows assessing negative emotions and conﬁdence in the memory –which is currently
not possible with the Greyson NDE scale.
At present, no study has formally compared the association of the NDE’s intensity and the phenomenological characterization of
NDE memory. This work then opens the way to new perspectives by observing the association of memory characteristics with NDE’s
intensity in the same sample of NDErs. We think that a more complete phenomenological assessment of NDEs is important for a better
description and ultimately a better understanding of the underlying psychological and cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, although
we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the intensity of NDE and its amount of associated memory characteristics, the question of
cause and eﬀect remains to be addressed in further work. In particular, the present results do not allow us to say whether it is the
increasing intensity of NDE that leads to a greater amount of memory characteristics or the inverse pattern. In addition, another
variable could also explain the associated variations we ﬁnd in this study. For example, it may be possible that the way in which
individuals encode and recall information is one variable inﬂuencing how they respond to both questionnaires. In addition, it is
important to highlight another limitation of the present study: this investigation may be subject to selection bias and hence may not
be representative of NDErs in general. Indeed, NDErs who do not contact us intentionally may possibly experience NDE memory
diﬀerently from those who do. Nevertheless, our study embraces a large sample and, in our view, those results are important as
people might know more about it and feel more comfortable.
5. Conclusions
The amount of memory details in a NDE (i.e. the MCQ total score) appears to be positively associated with the intensity of the
lived experience (i.e. the Greyson NDE scale total score). More speciﬁcally, our results highlight that sensory details (i.e. sounds,
smells and tastes), personal importance and reactivation frequency seem to vary with the intensity of the NDE (i.e. the Greyson NDE
scale total score). The challenge lies in explaining how memory formation can occur under life-threatening conditions in which the
individual is thought to be unconscious and at a time when memory formation would not be expected to operate eﬀectively.
Understanding the particular mechanisms of NDE memories and their formation will improve our understanding of the NDE phe-
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